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Every time I sat down to revise this talk for publication, there was a new 
story of some mis- or malfeasance by a major social media platform: Twitter 
declined to ban a man who was subsequently charged with sending bombs to the 
kind of people he harassed online;2 Facebook repeatedly allowed discriminatory 
                                                 
1 Rebecca Tushnet was the keynote speaker at the 2018 Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet 
Symposium. She received her A.B. from Harvard College and J.D. from Yale Law School. She 
previously clerked for Chief Judge Edward R. Becker on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit and for Associate Justice David H. Souter on the U.S. Supreme Court. She is presently a 
professor of Law at Harvard Law School. 
2 E.g., Andrew Liptak, Twitter Says It ‘Made a Mistake’ For Not Removing Threatening Tweets 
from Florida Bomb Suspect, VERGE (Oct. 27, 2018, 10:32 AM) 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/27/18031888/twitter-alleged-florida-bomber-threats-rochelle-
ritchie [https://perma.cc/8FCV-TYG9]. 
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advertising;3 and YouTube’s algorithm encouraged radicalization in order to keep 
people on the site.4 As James Grimmelmann depressingly concludes in his article 
on the same topic, everything is broken because platforms are broken.5 
I would put it a bit differently: everything is broken because people are 
broken. But that doesn’t mean we need to give up; rather, it means that we can’t. 
There is no alternative to being broken. There is only trying to make things better, 
imperfectly and unevenly. This process is inevitably ugly. As Tarleton Gillespie 
has written, content moderation is so difficult that “all things considered, it’s 
amazing that it works at all, and as well as it does…. Given the sheer enormity of 
the undertaking, most platforms’ definition of success includes failing users on a 
regular basis.”6 
                                                 
3 See Julia Angwin, Madeleine Varner and Ariana Tobin, Facebook Enabled Advertisers to Reach 
‘Jew Haters’, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 14, 2017, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-enabled-advertisers-to-reach-jew-haters 
[https://perma.cc/3M26-WV64] (enabling marketers to direct their advertisements to profiles that 
expressed anti-Semitic interests); Charles V. Bagli, Facebook Vowed to End Discriminatory 
Housing Ads. Suit Says It Didn’t, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/nyregion/facebook-housing-ads-discrimination-lawsuit.html 
[https://perma.cc/U9TH-7HFU] (alleging the website allowed housing discrimination); Jacob 
Kastrenakes, ACLU Says Facebook Allowed Discriminatory Job Ads That Didn’t Appear to 
Women, VERGE (Sept. 18, 2018, 9:19 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/18/17873448/facebook-job-ads-discrimination-women-aclu 
[https://perma.cc/NYK2-8PTQ] (allegedly allowed employers to post discriminatory job 
advertisements); Joe Miller, Facebook Sorry for ‘White Supremacist Ad’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-46083026 [https://perma.cc/7783-Y9HH] (allowing 
an advertisement that spread a conspiracy theory advocated for by white supremacists political 
ads). 
4 See Zeynep Tufekci, YouTube, the Great Radicalizer, N.Y. TIMES: OPINION 
(Mar. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-
radical.html. [https://perma.cc/66Z6-RNAF] (arguing YouTube has programmed its algorithms to 
suggest more extreme content to improve the platform’s profits); see also David Streitfeld, ‘The 
Internet Is Broken’: @ev Is Trying to Salvage It, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2017) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/technology/evan-williams-medium-twitter-internet.html 
[https://perma.cc/AP6M-WF3K] (“The trouble with the internet, Mr. Williams says, is that it 
rewards extremes. Say you’re driving down the road and see a car crash. Of course you look. 
Everyone looks. The internet interprets behavior like this to mean everyone is asking for car 
crashes, so it tries to supply them.”). 
5 James Grimmelmann, The Platform Is the Message, 2 Gᴇᴏ. L. Tᴇᴄʜ. Rᴇᴠ. 217, 233 (2018).  
6 TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, 
AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA, 197 (2018); see also id. at 77 (“[T]here 
are no hypothetical situations, and there are no cases that are different or really edgy . . . There’s 
just more and less frequent cases, all of which happen all of the time.”). 
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Where everything, including bad behavior, can be found in endless 
proliferation, what if anything can be done? My experience leads me to suggest a 
few lessons. I helped found a nonprofit, the Organization for Transformative Works 
(“OTW”), which focuses on protecting and preserving noncommercial 
transformative works, specifically fanfiction and other fanworks—that is, new 
stories and art based on existing, often in-copyright, works such as the Harry Potter 
series and Marvel’s Avengers movies. Fandom-specific nonprofit archives have 
existed for a long time and some are maintained by hardy individuals, but the OTW 
wanted to create a multi-fandom archive and to protect its continued existence with 
a legal structure that would be separate from the individual situation of any given 
archive maintainer. 
Our all-volunteer team—the largest majority-female open source coding 
project on the web, as far as we are aware—created software that allows fan creators 
to post and tag their works so that they can reach the right audiences. Our terms of 
service are not influenced by advertisers and our mission is to host all legal, 
noncommercial fanworks, even if that content is controversial, offensive, or badly 
spelled. The Archive of Our Own (“AO3”), our main website, hosts over four 
million works, supports over a million users, and garners over 115 million page 
views per week,7 making the AO3 the second most popular writing-focused website 
in existence.8 
It turns out, however, that while most fans are lovely people, some of them 
do really bad things, because fans are, first and foremost, people. Our success 
therefore hasn’t come without costs; the AO3’s all-volunteer content and abuse 
team faces some serious challenges. Not only do people sometimes abuse our 
platform by harassing or spamming other users, but they also sometimes abuse our 
content moderation process as a means of harassment. 
If you had asked me ten years ago, I would have been skeptical that a person 
would pretend to be another person’s parent, a police officer, or a lawyer 
representing a copyright claimant in order to get another person’s account closed. I 
no longer need to believe in these things—I’ve seen them. Indeed, according to 
Eugene Volokh, who’s extensively researched these falsehoods, fake court orders 
                                                 
7 Archive of Our Own, Fanfore.com, https://fanlore.org/wiki/Archive_of_Our_Own (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2019). 
8 Archive of Our Own, Similarweb.com, 
https://www.similarweb.com/website/archiveofourown.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2019). 
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to get content removed are popping up in other contexts, such as when someone 
wants to silence a blogger on Medium or remove negative content from search 
results so it will be unfindable.9 We aren’t alone in experiencing our own, 
intermediary version of “fake news.” 
While the OTW believes in fair use, we have also encountered situations 
where our users’ freely available works have been copied wholesale and sold 
without authorization on platforms like Amazon, violating our users’ copyright 
rights.10 We have also encountered cases where we have to act against confusing 
uses of our own trademarks. For example, a typosquatter used our website’s domain 
name, plus one letter, and mimicked our interface, including asking people for their 
login information—which looked like classic phishing for login credentials.11 
We’ve experienced a rightsholder’s frustration with intermediaries that don’t seem 
to care until you spend a lot of money on a formal process, whether that’s the 
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) for domain names 
or a potential lawsuit. We’ve had problems with apps on the Google and Apple app 
stores using our name and logos, at which point we receive complaints from 
frustrated users who paid for performance they aren’t getting and blame us—
whereas our site is and will remain free and ad-free.  
So, as the song says, I’ve seen the world from both sides now. We’ve sent 
cease and desist letters and received them. The legal process, in general, has worked 
very well for us, in substantial part because we are fortunate to have a highly 
qualified group of volunteer lawyers. Most sites, even commercial sites of our size, 
won’t have four or five experienced lawyers on call at any hour of the day. 
Nonetheless, despite our abundance of volunteer talent, we can’t hire ten thousand 
people to moderate content. With a limited annual budget, most of which goes to 
keeping the website running, we can’t even hire ten people. We rely on a small, 
hard-working, long-suffering team of volunteers to investigate reports of abuse, and 
they are doing their best, but they will never be able to catch everything. 
                                                 
9 See Revised Amicus Curiae Brief of Eugene Volokh in Support of Appellant, Hassell v. Bird, 
274 Cal. App. 4th 1336 (2016), 
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2484&context=historical. 
10 To preserve confidentiality, I will only discuss these types of incidents broadly, rather than 
identifying specific affected people. 
11 Organization for Transformative Works v. Binkley, Case No. D2018-0132, 
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/text.jsp?case=D2018-0132. 
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This is the personal background with which I come to what’s commonly 
understood as the most serious problem in the online ecosystem and, perhaps, in 
democracy as a whole: the presence of bad content. Copyright owners decry 
massive amounts of copyright infringement. Then there is the harassment and 
revenge porn mostly used to humiliate and blackmail women and massive amounts 
of fake news. What is to be done? 
While some people argue for increased government intervention in the form 
of legal duties to remove various types of unwanted content, others maintain that 
the best solution is to reconstruct some sort of democratic process within a service’s 
“polity” itself, a procedural solution to knotty problems of substance. I want to 
complicate the debate by discussing the multiple types of actors in the intermediary 
space; some entities, like the OTW, don’t resemble the profit-seeking model at 
which most regulatory and governance proposals are directed. Other online entities, 
such as those that participate in the domain name system, have very different 
functions and abilities than the websites and apps most people think of as “the 
internet.” If we don’t keep these variances in mind, we are unlikely to get the results 
we seek. It’s very hard to generalize beyond those cautions because things are 
changing so fast in terms of both content moderation policies and government 
action (such as the recent preliminary approval of a copyright filtering requirement 
for intermediaries in Europe,12 and the even more recent “embedding” of French 
officials into Facebook to see how it regulates hate speech13). 
 
I. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM LASTED TEN YEARS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
I will start with intellectual property issues, because that’s where I started 
my career and my work at the OTW. One thing that non-specialists are rarely aware 
of is the extensive regulation of domain names, done by the Internet Consortium 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) and the providers to which it has 
delegated authority to administer various top-level domains, like .com, .uk, or 
                                                 
12 James Vincent & Russell Brandom, Everything You Need To Know About Europe’s New 
Copyright Directive, VERGE, (Sept. 13, 2018, 2:14 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/13/17854158/eu-copyright-directive-article-13-11-internet-
censorship-google. 
13 Tony Romm & James McAuley, Facebook Will Let French Regulators Study Its Efforts to Fight 
Hate Speech, WASH. POST, (Nov. 12, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/11/12/facebook-will-let-french-regulators-
study-its-efforts-fight-hate-speech/?utm_term=.b2e3f9953d54. 
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newer entrants like .bike and .london. In 1999, trademark owners succeeded in 
procuring the UDRP, which is mandatory arbitration for trademark claims based on 
allegedly infringing domain names. Like other arbitration proceedings, the UDRP 
is generally cheaper and faster than litigation. 
Trademark owners secured this extra protection, which no other category of 
objections to individual domain names had, by virtue of their persistence (not to 
mention some decent arguments) in the multi-stakeholder, consensus-based process 
through which ICANN makes decisions. ICANN is not a government, and it’s not 
a democracy, but what it is can be hard to define, which is why its role in overseeing 
intellectual property issues in the domain name ecosystem is apparently still up for 
grabs. 
More recently, ICANN introduced a large number of new global top level 
domains—.london and .bike and hundreds of others. In order for trademark owners 
to accede to this expansion, which would also expand the potential number of 
domain names that could use their marks, trademark owners secured the Uniform 
Rapid Suspension (“URS”) process—which is supposed to be faster and cheaper 
than the UDRP, for no-brainer cases of infringing use. Complainants and 
respondents get fewer words and less time for their submissions than they would 
for a UDRP claim. 
The URS has now been in place for several years. Roughly 900 claims have 
been adjudicated, but it’s still hard to say whether the game is worth the candle. 
Most of the domain name registrants defaulted; those cases don’t seem to be 
decided noticeably faster than UDRP default cases. Though trademark owners were 
opposed to looking at individual cases to see if they truly were no-brainers, I asked 
my research assistants to code the cases to look at some of the more obvious 
questions. It seems that the URS is used by a relatively small number of trademark 
owners, even compared to the universe of trademark owners who have resort to the 
UDRP. Most cases do seem to involve simple infringing or at least non-bona fide 
uses, but a significant minority don’t provide enough information to figure out what 
the basis for the arbitrator’s decision was—which means that no one else can be 
sure what the rationale was, or evaluate whether it made sense.  
Trademark owners’ representatives are currently proposing to shorten 
response times and eliminate the ability for a domain registrant to cure a default, as 
well as to make the URS a “consensus policy,” exposing millions of domain names 
registered in “legacy” domains such as .com to potential challenge under the URS, 
with its lesser procedural protections compared to those of the UDRP. Likewise, 
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they are proposing to expand something known as the “claims” system to allow 
trademark owners broader rights to block or threaten potential registrants—even 
though the current system has been extensively used to make claims on common 
words like “cloud” and “hotel.” 
The broader point is that rightsholders don’t stop when they lose a public 
battle. Big trademark owners, like big copyright owners, can afford to be persistent, 
and they often believe they can’t afford not to be. As a result, when they don’t get 
remedies in national law, they often try to get more through international treaties, 
or in this case, through private policymaking at the chokepoints of internet 
connectivity. And, because the entities administering the system—domain name 
registries and registrars—don’t have much skin in the game for any given domain 
name, they may not fully take into account individual domain name registrants’ 
interests in their practices. For example, some registries and registrars are now 
selling extra services to trademark owners to allow them to block any registrations 
using their names, regardless of whether the use would be barred by the URS, 
UDRP, or trademark law—so Apple could block apple.farm for an apple farming 
operation, if .farm is operated by one of these registries.14 The carefully negotiated 
balance between registrant and free speech interests versus trademark interests that 
was supposed to result from the ICANN policies has been replaced by these private 
mechanisms, just as Content ID has replaced copyright and fair use rules on 
YouTube. 
This is also the future of content moderation, if we don’t make content 
moderation a public policy issue. And it’s not just trademark owners who want to 
use the domain name system to shut down allegedly bad actors—copyright owners 
are trying to get in on the game. They are arguing that registries should shut down 
domain names where the underlying domain is used to infringe copyrights. 
Annemarie Bridy has done important work documenting what people are willing to 
admit on the record about these new policies.15 Copyright owners claim that they 
                                                 
14 See Donuts, Brand Protection, https://donuts.domains/what-we-do/brand-protection (firm that 
controls a large number of top-level domains explaining the private control it sells to trademark 
owners) (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
15 See generally Annemarie Bridy, Notice and Takedown in the Domain Name System: ICANN's 
Ambivalent Drift into Online Content Regulation, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1345 (2017). 
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are only going after sites devoted to infringement, but without public guidelines 
and other transparency mechanisms we just have to take their word for it.16  
Some copyright owners argue that United States law isn’t good enough to 
protect their interests.17 After the failure of a proposed law that would have 
fundamentally changed platform liability for infringing content due to a massive 
public outcry, copyright owners are touting their policy preferences in subtler ways, 
both by the aforementioned private agreements with online platforms and through 
arguing that the current notice and takedown system for copyright infringement 
online is broken. As in Europe, certain copyright owners argue for mandatory 
filtering of all content, brilliantly renamed “notice and staydown” to sound only 
slightly different from the familiar notice and takedown.18 
Proponents of filtering argue that filtering isn’t much of a challenge for 
websites, and that the costs to speakers would be minimal. They take YouTube as 
their model: YouTube implements filters, so why not the internet as a whole? A 
reality check can be found in Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis, and Brianna L. 
Schofield’s important empirical work on the functioning of the copyright notice 
and takedown system in the U.S., which includes in-depth interviews with multiple 
intermediaries, including websites that host millions of pieces of user-generated 
content.19 
Although the OTW wasn’t part of their research, the results corresponded 
to our experience. What they found was that there are distinct models of copyright 
takedowns online. The vast majority of services, like the OTW, are what they call 
“DMCA20 Classic”: we receive relatively few notices of claimed infringement, few 
of them are automated, and we subject them to individual review for validity. We 
                                                 
16 Id. at 1347. 
17 Numerous examples can be found in the comments submitted in response to the Copyright 
Office’s inquiry on the functioning of the notice and takedown system, as well as in statements 
made at various roundtables the Office held on the subject. See Section 512 Study, 
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/ (collecting comments and transcripts) (last visited 
May 1, 2019). 
18 At the most recent Copyright Office roundtable, numerous industry participants applauded 
European developments and argued that the U.S. should follow Europe’s lead. See Transcript, 
Library of Congress, United States Copyright Office, Section 512 Study Roundtable, Monday, 
Apr. 8, 2019 (on file with journal). 
19 See generally Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis, & Brianna Schofield, Notice and Takedown: 
Online Service Provider and Rightsholder Accounts of Everyday Practice, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
OF THE U.S.A 371 (2017). 
20 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
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reject notices that ignore free speech and fair use or are trying to use the DMCA 
process to achieve non-copyright aims, such as trying to protect a claimed 
trademark in a title, and remove content that seems to be correctly identified as 
infringement.21 In essence, our process is artisanal rather than mass market.22 But 
we couldn’t continue to do that if we started to receive a flood of automated notices. 
Other models are adopted by services that do receive a large volume of 
automated notices, and they have responded by automating in return and sometimes 
also by going further than the DMCA requires. This “DMCA Plus” model includes 
some types of filtering and sometimes includes cutting deals with content owners 
to monetize user uploads of content claimed by someone else, as with YouTube’s 
Content ID.23 
There are plenty of problems with the Content ID model, but its deficiencies 
are not my focus here. A key objection to a filtering requirement for intermediaries 
that host user-generated content in general, as the European Community has 
decided to impose, is that it is fundamentally mistargeted. It takes a solution that 
has benefits for a few big copyright owners and big internet services and demands 
its imposition on other intermediaries—most of which don’t have a big 
infringement problem in the first place and many of which couldn’t continue to 
operate if they had to bear the costs of developing and constantly updating a 
filtering system. Ironically, because Europe is hostile to Facebook and YouTube, it 
has adopted a solution that ensures that Facebook and YouTube will continue to 
dominate, since they are the ones most likely to survive filtering and licensing 
requirements.24 
It’s not even a matter of size—some very big sites, like ours, Wikipedia, 
and Medium, are DMCA Classic sites receiving relatively few copyright claims 
                                                 
21 Urban et al., supra note 19, at 385. 
22 Cf. Robyn Caplan, Content or Context Moderation? Artisanal, Community-Reliant, and 
Industrial Approaches, https://datasociety.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/DS_Content_or_Context_Moderation.pdf, at 17 (noting that “Alex 
Feerst, head of legal for the blogging platform Medium, referred to their approach as ‘artisanal,’ or 
(being tongue-in-cheek) as ‘small-batch,’ to note that despite their more than 80 million users, 
their moderation approach is still done manually, ‘by human beings.’”). 
23 Urban et al., supra note 19, at 382-383. 
24 The newly adopted rules do exclude sites run by nonprofits, such as Wikipedia and the OTW’s 
archive, and they purport to allow small startups a few years to become compliant with filtering 
and licensing requirements, but given how quickly websites can expand the minimal exceptions 
for startups are unlikely to help. See Rachel Wolbers, Transcript, supra note 18, at 329-30. 
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and a relatively large proportion of invalid claims out of those few. Even Amazon’s 
large Kindle Direct program, which allows self-publishing, turns out to be better 
suited to DMCA Classic treatment. At hearings on the continued viability of the 
DMCA’s notice and takedown system, Amazon disclosed that half of the takedown 
requests it receives for Kindle Direct are from competitors trying to suppress 
another person’s book. These are not valid claims.25 “Notice and staydown” would 
worsen this problem rather than ameliorate it, harming legitimate creators trying to 
reach audiences. 
This isn’t to say that DMCA Classic sites are the only ones who experience 
problems. As Urban and her coauthors explained, “[n]early every OSP recounted 
stories of deliberate gaming of the DMCA takedown process, including to harass 
competitors, to resolve personal disputes, to silence critics, or to threaten the OSP 
or damage its relationship with its users. And although the proportion of 
problematic requests varied by type of OSP, every OSP also told stories of 
takedowns that ignored fair use defenses or that targeted non-infringing material.”26 
Attempts to impose more obligations are likely to fail to decrease pure, 
substitutionary copying, because users dedicated to piracy excel at finding ways to 
route around obstacles. By contrast, ordinary good-faith users are more likely to get 
accidentally caught in a trap. Given this dynamic, where automated filtering and 
blocking deters the wrong people, each failed measure is likely to lead to demands 
for ever more restrictive actions, suppressing more and more legitimate speech in 
the process—if only by driving websites with fewer resources out of business.27 
                                                 
25 Stephen Worth, Assoc. Gen. Couns. of Amazon.com, Inc., Testimony at the U.S. Copyright Off. 
Section 512 Study, Public Roundtable (May 13, 2016) (transcript available in the U.S. Copyright 
Office website). (“[W]ith Kindle Direct publishing, authors routinely try to climb to the top spot in 
their category . . . by issuing bogus notices against higher ranking titles. And this for us actually 
accounts for more than half of the takedown notices that we receive.”). 
26 Urban et al., supra note 16, at 389. 
27 Id. at 397 (one “respondent described his company’s history of experimentation with 
‘reasonable and effective’ measures beyond notice and takedown, but viewed most of the 
strategies proposed by rightsholders as ineffective, and therefore certain to be followed by more 
demands if adopted.”); Id. at 399 (“In some striking cases, it appears that the vulnerability of 
smaller OSPs to the costs of implementing large-scale notice and takedown systems and adopting 
expensive DMCA Plus practices can police market entry, success, and competition. Those without 
sufficient resources to build or license automated systems described being in precarious positions, 
at risk of being priced out of the market by better-resourced competition if floods of notices or 
DMCA Plus requirements were to arrive.”); Id. at 400 (noting estimated cost of filtering: $60 
million to develop Google’s Content ID, and $10,000–12,000 per month for Audible Magic for 
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Ultimately, the DMCA’s notice and takedown system, like democracy, 
might be the worst possible system except for all the others that have been tried. 
While market pressures might drive large sites like YouTube to more filter-based 
systems, it is important not to treat YouTube as a model for the internet at large—
unless all we want from the internet is YouTube. 
 
II. STRANGE APPS HANDING OUT BADGES IS NO BASIS FOR A SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNMENT 
 
A. The Need for Eyeballs and the Impulse to Regulate 
 
Outside of intellectual property, content moderation faces even more varied 
and unpredictable instances of wrongdoing, including false news and harassment. 
Unlike a situation of claimed copyright infringement, there’s no underlying work 
with which to compare the allegedly violative content, so some other metric for 
removing a user’s post has to be devised. But what might that be? As James 
Grimmelmann has explained, there’s no answer to this question in the abstract. A 
post that decries eating Tide Pods and one that encourages eating Tide Pods, for 
example, can be indistinguishable from the outside, given the ways in which the 
social meaning of an individual piece of communication is constructed: “The 
difficulty of distinguishing between a practice, a parody of the practice, and a 
commentary on the practice is bad news for any legal doctrines that try to 
distinguish among them, and for any moderation guidelines or ethical principles 
that try to draw similar distinctions.”28 Even worse, this can equally be true of 
arguably racist content, especially when moderators are from other countries and 
don’t have the full background required to distinguish someone who is reporting a 
racial slur they experienced from someone who is using that racial slur to cause 
more harm. 
These intractable problems are generated and worsened by commercial 
interests. Because major social media platforms are ad-driven, they need to keep 
their users on their sites as long as possible. Therefore, they prioritize showing users 
content that will keep them watching or reading and they are indifferent to whether 
                                                 
one medium-sized service and $25,000 per month for another service, plus additional, ongoing 
implementation, negotiation, and review costs). 
28 Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 221-22. 
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that’s doing overall social harm to society, or to users themselves.29 Their responses 
to “bad speech” depend on their profit motives, which both drive some speech 
protections (when most users like the speech) and provide a reason (or an excuse) 
for other speech suppression. For example, pressure from advertisers led YouTube 
to crack down on “pro-terrorism” speech on the platform, while addressing white 
supremacist speech has proved more challenging, in significant part because of the 
right-wing elected officials who might be caught up in any white supremacist 
purge.30 Klonick argues that “platforms are economically responsive to the 
expectations and norms of their users,” which leads them “to both take down 
content their users don’t want to see and keep up as much content as possible,” 
including by pushing back against government takedown requests.31 But this 
formulation equivocates about who the relevant “users” are—participants on the 
platform or advertisers. Content that advertisers or large copyright owners don’t 
want to see is far more vulnerable than content that individual participants don’t 
want to see.32  
Here again it’s worth comparing the AO3 to commercial platforms. The 
AO3 is a volunteer, voluntarily-funded space whose commitments are directed 
towards satisfying users’ preferences without the need to generate ad revenue.33 
Although it lacks Facebook’s massive engineering staff, the AO3 also doesn’t seem 
to need complex algorithms to present users with the content that the AO3 “thinks” 
                                                 
29 Id. at 227. 
30 Joseph Cox & Jason Koebler, Why Won’t Twitter Treat White Supremacy Like ISIS? Because It 
Would Mean Banning Some Republican Politicians Too, MOTHERBOARD, Apr. 25, 2019, 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/a3xgq5/why-wont-twitter-treat-white-supremacy-like-
isis-because-it-would-mean-banning-some-republican-politicians-too. 
31 Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 Hᴀʀᴠ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1598, 1664 (2018). 
32 On YouTube, for example, shifting policies (or lack of policies) on what content can be 
monetized have repeatedly angered the platform’s content creators, because YouTube is trying to 
placate advertisers. See Julia Alexander, The Yellow $: A Comprehensive History of 
Demonetization and Youtube’s War With Creators, POLYGON, May 10, 2018, 
https://www.polygon.com/2018/5/10/17268102/youtube-demonetization-pewdiepie-logan-paul-
casey-neistat-philip-defranco (“Ariel Bardin, YouTube’s vice president of product management, 
addressed the changes that Schindler spoke about in her own creator’s blog post. ‘There’s a 
difference between the free expression that lives on YouTube and the content that brands have told 
us they want to advertise against,’ Bardin said ….”). 
33 See Elizabeth Minkel, The Online Free Speech Debate is Raging in Fan Fiction, Too, The 
Verge(Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/8/18072622/fanfic-ao3-free-speech-
censorship-fandom. (showing that these rules are hotly debated within fandom, because what is 
welcoming to some users can be exclusionary to others).  
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET • VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2019 





those users want to see. Instead, it has a user-centered set of tools for displaying 
works of interest. Users can subscribe to the specific tags creators use to describe 
their works, or they can assemble their own search terms. Search results are shown 
in order of newest to oldest by default, though a user can tweak how search results 
are displayed in various ways—sorting by length, number of views, or kudos (the 
AO3 equivalent of “likes”), and so on. Users complain about the difficulty of 
finding what they want—users always complain about the difficulty of finding what 
they want—but they don’t need to worry about the AO3 manipulating what they 
see to make them happier or sadder, or to make them more or less likely to vote, or 
to make them more (never less) likely to buy advertisers’ products. 
 
B. Facebook as Government, Facebook as Fiduciary? 
 
What might we do about those platforms that do try to shape users’ 
experiences to keep them on-site as long as possible, in ways that seem to cause 
harmful externalities? As with so many issues of free expression in the modern 
world, Jack Balkin got there first.34 Balkin argues that many of the dominant online 
players, like Facebook and Google, should be treated as “information fiduciaries” 
toward their end-users.35 Under the fiduciary model, they would have duties to act 
in good faith and to avoid manipulation of those users.36 Concepts of due process, 
transparency in decision-making, and equal treatment are also consistent with the 
fiduciary model, as well as with an idea of the social media platform as a little 
republic: a system that is in need of governance and thus of government.37 
                                                 
34 Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and 
New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C.D. L. Rᴇᴠ.. 1149 (2017-2018). See also Jack M. Balkin, 
Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain, Hᴏᴏᴠᴇʀ Wᴏʀᴋɪɴɢ Gʀᴏᴜᴘ ᴏɴ Nᴀᴛ’ʟ Sᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ, Tᴇᴄʜ., ᴀɴᴅ 
L. (Hᴏᴏᴠᴇʀ Iɴꜱᴛɪᴛᴜᴛɪᴏɴ, Aegis Series Paper No. 1814), Oct. 16, 2018 at 11-15.  
35 Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment in the Second Gilded Age, BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2019) (manuscript at 28-29) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=3253939) [https://perma.cc/H8QV-CRR6] 
(explaining how the relationship between social media companies and their users meet the four 
standards of a fiduciary relationship—“(1) the company provides special services based on special 
expertise; (2) there is a great asymmetry in knowledge between the company and its clients; (3) 
clients are especially vulnerable to the company because of the company’s knowledge about them; 
and (4) the need for clients to trust the company to receive the benefit of the service.”). 
36 Id. at 29.  
37 See Balkin, supra note 24 at 1162, 1196-97. 
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What we have in the online ecospace is a version of ontogeny recapitulating 
phylogeny. As online services become more like places where we live most of our 
lives, we want them to behave more like governments, or branches of governments. 
For example, Facebook’s policy team has a biweekly content meeting, in which 
different teams across the company—engineering, legal, content reviewers, and 
external partners like nonprofit groups—provide recommendations to the content 
moderation team for inclusion in the policy guidebook.38 Tellingly, the team leader 
called this meeting a “mini legislative session.”39 Facebook has also adopted and 
adapted concepts familiar from First Amendment doctrine to identify when 
objectionable content should be removed, specifically newsworthiness and the 
concept of a public figure.40 
Indeed, Kate Klonick’s study of major platforms finds that Facebook is not 
unique: everyone’s policies have “marked similarities to legal or governance 
systems. This includes the creation of a detailed list of rules, trained human 
decision-making to apply those rules, and reliance on a system of external influence 
to update and amend those rules.”41 The rules are usually similar for users in and 
outside the U.S. Regardless of what the underlying legal structure is or whether an 
institution is essentially inventing a structure from scratch, it turns out that speech 
regulations pose standard issues of definition (defamation and hate speech are 
endlessly flexible), enforcement (who will catch the violators?), and equity/fairness 
(who will watch the watchmen?). 
These details of implementation are far more than trivial. Among other 
things, as we have seen here and in other countries, governments quickly learn how 
                                                 
38 Alexis C. Madrigal, Inside Facebook's Fast-Growing Content-Moderation Effort, Tʜᴇ 
Aᴛʟᴀɴᴛɪᴄ, (Feb. 7, 2018) https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/what-facebook-
told-insiders-about-how-it-moderates-posts/552632. 
39 Id. See also Heather Whitney, Emerging Threats: Search Engines, Social Media, and the 
Editorial Analogy, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. 27-28 (Feb. 2018), 
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/search-engines-social-media-and-editorial-analogy (“The 
government-like character of the leading tech companies has been acknowledged by the 
companies themselves. Almost a decade ago, Zuckerberg opined, “In a lot of ways Facebook is 
more like a government than a traditional company. We have this large community of people, and 
more than other technology companies we’re really setting policies.”). 
40 Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (2018), 
https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Kate_Klonick_Emerging_Threats.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3XNJ-PSL3]. 
41 Klonick, supra note 22, at 1602. 
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to use, and misuse, platform mechanisms for their own benefit.42 Reacting to 
government manipulation of an abuse team by coordinated reporting of dissidents 
for policy violations can be difficult—and platforms may even decide not to resist 
that manipulation. Some of these abusive techniques, moreover, resist handling by 
an abuse team even when identified. When government-backed teams overwhelm 
social media with trivialities in order to distract from a potentially important 
political event, as is apparently common in China, what policies or algorithms could 
identify the pattern, much less sort the wheat from the chaff? 
Fiduciary treatment of the kind Balkin has advocated for could require some 
sort of attempt to fix these problems – to protect users against epistemic fraud that 
destabilizes the foundations of knowledge and social trust.43 However, 
paradoxically or ironically, proposals for regulation tend to lock in the idea that 
large online spaces where people engage with one another will be privatized and 
profit-seeking, and thus will have the cash on hand to hire the moderators and build 
the automated tools that the regulators think are likely to diminish whatever harms 
they’re concerned about. But this presumption has significant negative 
consequences not just for the startups who can’t necessarily comply with complex 
regulatory schemes, but also for non-governmental, nonprofit actors who don’t 
want to build something advertising-driven. 
For example, Balkin’s proposal—in part to deal with First Amendment 
objections that would arise if the government tried to impose new fiduciary content 
moderation duties on platforms—suggests incentivizing platforms to opt in to 
fiduciary obligations by conditioning the platform’s immunity for harmful content 
posted by users on its assumption of such obligations.44 However, this solution 
requires changing the baseline in the US to remove that immunity, which presently 
protects the AO3, Wikipedia, Medium, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and hundreds 
                                                 
42 ZEYNEP TUFCEKI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED 
PROTEST 230-31 (2017) (surveying the ways in which governments have used online platforms for 
their own ends, including generating public hatred and uncertainty about truth). 
43 But see Lina Khan & David Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 Harvard 
Law Review (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3341661, 
draft at 13 (noting that “it is unclear how a digital fiduciary is supposed to fulfill its duty of loyalty 
to users under conditions of ‘perpetual’ conflict” between the interests of advertisers and the 
interests of ordinary platorm users). 
44 See also GILLESPIE, supra note 5, at 43-44 (suggesting that legal immunities could be 
conditioned on having obligations such as meeting minimum standards for effective content 
moderation, some degree of transparency or specific structures for due process and appeal of 
decisions). 
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of other smaller platforms—many of which will lack the resources to look like a 
fiduciary if pervasive content moderation is the desired model. That change could 
expose many smaller platforms to potentially devastating liability and encourage 
sites to take down any challenged content no matter its truth value. Maybe we could 
at least exempt the AO3 and Wikipedia by being more generous to nonprofits or to 
sites with non-Facebook-sized userbases, but the problem suggests the complexity 
of the issues. 
Another question that deserves more attention is this: if what we are talking 
about are truly governance structures, why should citizens of a democracy accept 
anything other than actual democracy, either representative or otherwise, in the 
regulation of these spaces? Shouldn’t you have to win an election to be “mayor” of 
a place on Foursquare? Right now, this criticism is mainly raised in the context of 
the fact that the employees and corporate officers of the major platforms “aren’t 
nearly as diverse as their user bases.”45 A more democratic form of governance 
would seem to necessitate product design involving actual representatives of the 
user base, not just the advertisers.46 Anti-gerrymandering activists say that voters 
should pick their politicians, rather than politicians picking their voters; perhaps we 
need a similar design principle for dominant platforms. Any such solution would 
have to involve representation, not direct democracy. When Facebook said it would 
allow users to vote on its policies, the experiment was a massive failure—because 
it wanted them to vote on policies they had no reason to read, and more generally 
because it tried to use direct voting on a population of a size requiring representative 
government.47 
Given the lack of transparency and democratic input into the rules, 
Facebook’s content moderation systems—and those of many other platforms—
resemble, as David Pozen argues, “a system of authoritarian or absolutist 
constitutionalism. Authoritarian constitutionalism … accepts many governance 
features of constitutional democracy ‘with the noteworthy exception of … 
                                                 
45 Tonya Riley, Who’s Afraid of Online Speech? A Future Tense Event Recap, SLATE (Feb. 08, 
2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/02/whos-afraid-of-online-speech-a-future-tense-event-
recap.html. 
46 See also GILLESPIE, supra note 5, at 12 (pointing to an overrepresentation of libertarian white 
males in Silicon Valley). 
47 Eric Goldman, Facebook Isn’t—and Shouldn’t Be—A Democracy, Dec 17, 2012, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/12/17/facebook-isnt-and-shouldnt-be-a-
democracy. 
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democracy itself.’ … [A]bsolutist constitutionalism … occurs when ‘a single 
decisionmaker motivated by an interest in the nation’s well-being consults widely 
and protects civil liberties generally, but in the end, decides on a course of action 
in the decisionmaker’s sole discretion, unchecked by any other institutions.’”48 
Even if we are highly confident that the decisionmaker is good—and very few 
platforms have earned our trust in this regard—there remains the question of 
whether it is legitimate for decisions to be made in this way. Is users’ presumed 
consent enough, especially when it is so very hard to avoid Facebook or its 
subsidiaries?  
 
C. But Can a Government Moderate Content? Possible American 
Analogies 
 
An obvious problem of treating Facebook like a real government is that, in 
the United States, Facebook-as-government could not regulate much of the speech 
that makes parts of the web a hateful cesspool, given the commands of the First 
Amendment—nor could the government regulate for Facebook.49 This blunt legal 
fact seems to be driving the somewhat clumsy “fiduciary” workaround for 
improving governance from U.S. theorists. 
Many people who think the First Amendment is generally a good idea might 
still be willing to accept more interventionist models of content moderation because 
institutions like Facebook and Google are more like schools than like full 
governments. These platforms are institutions that have near-total effects on some 
people some of the time, but that still leave a broader world outside with which 
users have significant interactions. Similarly, schools needn’t be representative 
democracies as long as they have sufficient connection to the overall democratic 
polity, such that policies are in the end influenced both by area experts and by the 
people’s elected representatives. There’s a hell full of devils in the details. Still, 
democratic oversight might be sufficient to establish the kinds of policies we want, 
while leaving implementation largely to unelected people within given platforms. 
The school model may also provide some guidance for handling the 
inevitability of terrible individual decisions by platforms. For both schools and 
platforms, failing an individual is simultaneously a tragedy worth investing heavily 
                                                 
48 David Pozen, Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Facebookland, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. 
(2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/authoritarian-constitutionalism-facebookland. 
49 Whitney, supra note 29, at 29. 
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in preventing and also guaranteed to happen some percentage of the time, given the 
size of the task—and even a small percentage is a large absolute number. Failures 
should neither be excused nor used to condemn the entire enterprise. The spread of 
viral content ensures that there will always be something else shocking to worry 
about, some new violation of the rules or violation of norms that requires a new 
rule we didn’t know we needed before. Children are equally inventive, and 
constantly new ones appear, in need of proper socialization. Schools will therefore 
always be in crisis, always making thousands of small-scale content moderation 
decisions. We generally think of handling this ongoing chaos as a matter of training 
and some outside supervision, rather than individualized judicial review except in 
the very worst cases of abuse. The system can be functional even if it predictably 
fails in small ways all the time, as long as we neither think we have the best system 
possible nor give up on it as too rotten to improve. That might be the best feasible 
model for the larger information environment, as well. 
We could also look beyond schools to find other models of messy content 
regulation within democratically responsive governance structures. For example, 
what if platforms were run the way public libraries are? Libraries are the real 
“sharing” economies, and in the U.S., they have resisted government surveillance 
and content filtering as a matter of mission. The AO3 has much more in common 
with libraries than it does with Facebook. Just as libraries struggle to welcome 
everyone and to arrange their space so that the people looking at adult content don’t 
drive out the kids and the kids don’t preclude adults from reading what they choose 
to read, the AO3’s design prioritizes the ability to host multiple overlapping and 
sometimes conflicting communities.  
Instead of managing physical space, the emphasis online is on “tagging” 
content so that only those who want to see, or don’t mind seeing, particular types 
of content will be exposed to it. Along with requiring creators to identify the 
fandom of a work and encouraging them to identify the characters who appear and 
the romantic or sexual relationships that will be featured, the AO3 has several major 
content warnings—for rape, major character death, and underage sex—that users 
repeatedly indicated were important to them. Creators can also add whatever 
additional “freeform” tags they want to warn or entice readers. Further, the AO3 
allows creators a “Choose Not To Warn” option, which itself puts readers on notice 
that any of the major content warnings may or may not be present. The theory is 
that readers can decide for themselves what risks they are willing to take. A 
violation of the tagging rules in general does not lead a user’s work to be removed, 
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but, in appropriate cases, the abuse team may add “Choose Not To Warn” if the 
creator fails to do so herself. Again, the nonprofit structure and ethos matters to the 
sustainability of this model: creators and users have generally embraced tagging 
because they want to find the right audiences and creators, but tagging can also be 
cumbersome and time-consuming, so most commercial platforms require far less 
than the AO3 does in order to not deter potentially valuable content.50  
Together, the school and the library provide additional models for dealing 
with disputes over content and behavior. While they certainly aren’t perfect, they 
have the advantage of being established parts of public infrastructure, with histories 
of imagining the world differently than do private profit-seeking corporations.  
 
III. LOVE IN THE TIME OF CONTENT MODERATION 
 
James Grimmelmann memorably argued that “responsible content 
moderation is necessary, and … responsible content moderation is impossibly 
hard.”51 Paradox, however, need not mean defeat. It could mean instead that we 
must continue to fight bad behavior, and fail, and continue again. If there is any 
hope for the future of democratic governance (which there may not be) it is that 
contradiction is where democracies, if not algorithms, regularly live, trying not to 
be overwhelmed by the paradox of tolerance. In this chaos, it would be helpful to 
remember that Facebook and YouTube aren’t the world, and they aren’t even the 
internet. We don’t need to accept them as they are, and we also shouldn’t accept 
them as our models for internet governance, whether internally generated or 
externally imposed. There are other possibilities, and some of them already exist; 
as lawmakers increasingly experiment with new forms of internet regulation, they 
should take care not to crush those alternatives in the name of bringing Facebook 
and Google to heel. 
                                                 
50 See GILLESPIE, supra note 5, at 199-200 (discussing platforms’ hesitancies to embrace flagging, 
but expanding upon the possibility of tagging as a mechanism to filter out material and content). 
51 Grimmelmann, supra note 4, at 217. 
